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INTRODUCTION
The essays in this Symposium occupy two distinct scholarly realms: local
government law and the separation of powers. Unsurprisingly, the
contributors are preoccupied with different questions. The local government
scholars writing about executive power tend to emphasize the ways in which it
might invigorate weak city governments,' while those we would typically term
executive power scholars are-with two noteworthy exceptions2 - mostly
interested in figuring out how to tame an overly energetic national executive.'
If the academic world is divided between lumpers and splitters, the conference
would seem to confirm the intuitions of the latter. A closer look, however,
reveals several interesting opportunities for cross-pollination.
The goal of this brief Commentary is to offer a general conceptual frame for
connecting some of the localist and nationalist strands in this Issue. It does so
by bumping the analysis up one level of generality in order to identify two
institutional fixes common to both the local government law essays and
executive power essays. One relies on the "power of the sovereign"; the other
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1. E.g., Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local
Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2570-76 (2006).
2. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280
(20o6); Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512
(2006).
3. E.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2o06); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?
Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, ii5 YALE L.J. 2446
(20o6).
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relies on the "power of the servant." What these concepts add to the debate is a
bit of shared terminology-a way of capturing a set of distinctions that run
through large portions of constitutional law (and other areas as well). 4 They
thus allow us to compare and contrast the markedly varied policy proposals
offered by four of the Symposium's participants' and serve as the basis for
some quite preliminary and necessarily truncated observations about the
debates taking place in this Issue.
I. CONNECTING THE DOTS: TWO INSTITUTIONAL MODELS FOR
CORRECTING POWER IMBALANCES
Though the local government and executive power scholars focus on a
similar problem- correcting a perceived power imbalance-the contexts in
which that imbalance arises are quite different. The local government law
scholars are largely worried about what we might call a federalism problem-
weak cities in need of protection against an overweening state and/or national
government. The executive power scholars, in contrast, are primarily
concerned with the balance of power among three nominally coequal branches
of government. Put more succinctly, the local government scholars are focused
on vertical power imbalances whereas the executive power scholars worry
about horizontal inequities.6 The fixes for these power imbalances, according
to the contributors to this Issue, similarly involve a vertical or horizontal
redistribution of power.
What connects these disparate scholarly projects is the institutional
correctives the contributors suggest for addressing the power imbalance. The
first and more conventional fix harnesses what one might call "the power of the
sovereign." This familiar strategy relies on sovereignty or its functional
equivalent to mediate the relationship between two institutional actors. For
scholars proposing a vertical corrective, the power of the sovereign is a variant
4. Needless to say, the ideas behind these terms are not new. To the contrary, scholars in both
fields have explored these institutional fixes in far greater depth and nuance than I could
hope to offer here.
5. Given space constraints, here I will focus on the essays by David Barron, Neal Katyal, Bill
Marshall, and Richard Schragger.
6. For a useful discussion of these differences, see David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities
Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2220-21 (2006). This description
necessarily simplifies the nature of these institutional relations. In those areas in a federal
system where the states are sovereign, of course, they are no longer in a truly hierarchical
relationship with the national government. Similarly, even under a separation-of-powers
scheme, the executive serves as Congress's agent (with Congress's power over the executive
branch subject to certain limitations).
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of federalism. By casting the lower-level institution as sovereign, federalism
creates a formally or informally delineated zone of autonomy to protect against
undue interference from above. David Barron, for instance, argues that we
should preserve space for urban policymaking,7 expanding or maintaining the
city's de facto sovereignty.8 For scholars proposing a horizontal fix, the power
of the sovereign similarly relies on zones of autonomy. Here, however, the
institutional actors are roughly coequal members of government- mimicking
the classic separation-of-powers model-rather than institutions placed on
different rungs of the constitutional hierarchy. Bill Marshall, for instance,
proposes the creation of an independent Federal Attorney General.' Thus, in
both its horizontal and vertical forms, the power of the sovereign relies on
autonomy and separation to ensure that ambition is able to counteract
ambition.
A second, counterintuitive institutional fix proposed in this Issue relies on
what I term "the power of the servant" to check a power imbalance. This fix
depends on the ability of an institutional actor placed somewhere down the
chain of command to influence the decision-maker who is nominally the boss.
Unlike the sovereign, the servant lacks autonomy and, if push comes to shove,
must cede to the higher authority. The power of the servant thus stems mainly
from dependence: The fact that the higher authority needs the servant to
perform a task creates space not just for discretionary decision-making, but
also for bureaucratic pushback. On this view, the stronger the connective
tissues that bind the master and servant, the more likely it is that the servant
will be able to cajole, bargain with, even place demands upon the master. It is
not merely that power runs in both directions. The power of the servant also
rests on the assumption that familiarity will breed trust-conferring a sort of
community standing on the servant, as I argue below, and thereby further
augmenting the servant's ability to influence the master. The power of the
servant, in short, depends on administrative overlap, not division; on
integration, not isolation.
7. See id. at 2247-49.
8. Cities, of course, generally lack the formal guarantees of sovereignty that "our federalism"
affords states. But most states cede cities some local autonomy either as a matter of formal
state guarantee or institutional practice. See Schragger, supra note i, at 2556-57.
9. Marshall, supra note 3, at 2471-78. Note that Marshall's essay nonetheless assumes that the
Governor will generally remain more powerful than the Attorney General despite their
shared placement in the governance hierarchy. See, e.g., infra note 28.
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A. Empowering Cities
To ground this analysis a bit, consider the two local government law essays
in this Issue. David Barron's typically nuanced argument favors a sovereignty
model for strengthening cities. He asserts that San Francisco's decision to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples should not have been premised on
federal constitutional grounds.
Arguing against the conventional view of San Francisco's actions, he
observes,
[T]he problem with San Francisco's disregard of California's marriage
laws was not (as the court suggested) that its action was too localist,
but rather that it was not localist enough. San Francisco was not
seeking freedom from state law so that its officers could adopt a
distinct, local marriage policy for San Franciscans. Instead, the city
claimed that higher law required all local officers to grant, rather than
deny, licenses to same-sex couples seeking to marry."
Barron thus argues that "local constitutional challenges that seek simply the
substitution of one central directive for another are of less import, as a
structural matter, than those that attempt to afford cities the space to make
their own choices through the practice of local politics."'1 Sovereignty, Barron
contends, empowers cities; the generation of additional state or federal
mandates does not. Not only could such mandates narrow the policymaking
space afforded to urban decision-makers, but undue engagement with state or
national politics might dissipate energy better devoted to local concerns. 2
Local government law scholar Richard Schragger, in contrast, is intrigued
by the possibilities associated with the power of the servant. Noting the many
ways in which a city's fate depends on its ability to influence higher levels of
government,13 Schragger argues that "there is no necessary relationship
between the formal decentralization of power and the actual exercise of
io. Barron, supra note 6, at 2222.
ii. Id. at 2249.
12. Thanks to David Barron for emphasizing this point in our discussions.
13. Schragger, supra note 1, at 2556-64. Schragger has pursued strands of this argument
elsewhere in a thought-provoking debate with Rick Hills in which the authors examine
different models of local power. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism?
The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, Cities
as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147 (2005).
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political influence, between 'legal localism' and 'political localism.' 1 4 He points
to a study of the powerful French mayoralty, noting,
For most of France's modern history, financial power and legal
authority were officially concentrated in the hands of the central state,
with localities merely fulfilling state mandates. But "the ability of the
central state to achieve its territorial goals depended upon the active
consent and co-operation of local elected officials."'"
Schragger continues by noting that in the United States, "the formal
independence of the local, state, and federal governments means that state and
federal governments rarely need the direct cooperation or assistance of local
officials to achieve state or national aims.' 6 Drawing on Justice Breyer's
dissent in Printz v. United States,17 Schragger observes that the French example
raises questions about the Supreme Court's decision in Printz, which "treat[s]
subfederal governments as bureaucratically (and formally) autonomous,"
something that "does not necessarily lead to increased local power.""
Elsewhere, he argues that the power of mayors in the regional and national
competition for resources "is constrained by their lack of a national political
role. ' ' 9
Schragger thus argues that a sovereignty solution-a federalist system
designed to protect urban autonomy-may not strengthen cities as effectively
as a more centralized model, in which a city could take advantage of the
potential power of the servant.2" In his words, because mayors are not "direct
participants in state and federal policymaking" but "outsiders to it," they lack
the type of "ongoing relationships with federal elected officials or federal
bureaucracies" that make lobbying for resources more effective.2 Consistent
14. Schragger, supra note i, at 2561-62.
15. Id. at 2561 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Walter Nicholls, Power and Governance:
Metropolitan Governance in France, 42 UR-. STUD. 783, 788 (2005)). Schragger does observe,
however, that another difference in institutional practice may at least partially account for
this phenomenon: "[I]n France, elected officials can hold local and national political office
simultaneously." Id. at 2569.
16. Id. at 2563.
17. 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18. Schragger, supra note 1, at 2563.
19. Id. at 2546.
2o. Schragger is, of course, quite careful to avoid overclaiming, as he specifically refuses to argue
that "a unitary state or a more 'cooperative' federal system would necessarily serve cities and
their mayors better." Id. at 2563.
21. Id. at 2562.
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with his observations, Schragger's institutional fix for urban weakness is to
take advantage of the power of the servant by further integrating city officials
in state and national governance, thereby increasing the connective tissues that
bind higher- and lower-level decision-makers.
B. Harnessing the Federal Executive
If we look to two of the contributors on the executive power side of the
Symposium, we can also discern efforts to harness the power of the sovereign
and the power of the servant to check an increasingly powerful executive
branch. Bill Marshall offers a solution that straightforwardly relies on the
power of the sovereign- bicameralism for the executive branch. He suggests
that "[a]n independent attorney general, in the form of the state divided
executive, may . . . be an appropriate model from which to reconstruct a
workable system of intrabranch checks and balances"2 and shows how a
similar division of power at the state level has worked in practice.
Neal Katyal's essay, in contrast, relies on both the power of the servant and
the power of the sovereign to limit the President's power. The main thrust of
Katyal's essay is that we should take advantage of lower-level administrators
and bureaucratic overlap to tame an overly energetic executive.23 Consistent
with the servant model, he suggests strategies for increasing presidential
dependence on the bureaucracy, such as reporting and consultation
mandates.' 4
Interestingly, however, although Katyal wants checks to emanate from
competing bureaucratic servants, he self-consciously relies on the power of the
sovereign - a separation-of-powers scheme - as an institutional fix (hence the
title of his essay). Thus, even as Katyal seeks to increase the ties between the
President and his underlings, his proposed reforms seem designed primarily to
turn bureaucracies into quasi-sovereigns, protecting them from undue
interference by the President and making it harder for the President to overrule
their decisions.
5
While Katyal terms his proposal "internal separation of powers," in fact it
looks more like internal federalism. After all, unlike Marshall, Katyal never
22. Marshall, supra note 3, at 2478-79.
23. Katyal, supra note 3, at 2317.
24. Id. at 2327, 2339-42.
25. Id. at 2329-35 (proposing rules that would protect agency bureaucrats from presidential
retaliation and undue political influence); id. at 2337-39 (discussing protective measures for
a proposed "Director of Adjudication").
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proposes creating a competing institutional actor coequal to the President.
Under his scheme, checks on the President emanate instead from subsidiary
executive actors, just as the checks from federalism are supplied by the states.
Even the language Katyal uses to describe his proposal resonates with the
language of federalism: a system of overlapping bureaucracies with unique
internal cultures that serve as "laboratories" and foster interagency
"competition. "26 One might even draw an (admittedly rough) analogy between
the measures Katyal suggests to empower agency actors-allowing the
President to override lower-level decision-makers but not demand their public
acquiescence- and some weak variant of the anticommandeering principle.
CONCLUSION
Using the notions of sovereign and servant to examine the contributions to
this Issue, we can find connections between the seemingly disparate policy
proposals the authors offer. The long-term hope, of course, is that this type of
transsubstantive vocabulary might allow us to draw from the extensive work
scholars have already generated in thinking about these institutional design
questions in fields like local government law, federalism, and the separation of
powers and say something more systematic about these institutional fixes across
disciplines.27 Given space constraints, however, I will close simply by
suggesting two modest ways in which these conceptual categories might help
us work through some of the ideas raised by the contributors.
First, the categories offered here highlight a common dilemma for those
relying on a sovereignty model in a context where "hard" or formal protections
of autonomy cannot be had. It is not difficult, after all, to believe that a
sovereignty model will usually give more powers to local actors than a
centralized system. But what happens when one blends a federal system and a
centralized system? Consider, for instance, Barron's and Katyal's essays. Both
favor a sovereignty model in a context in which de jure sovereignty does not
exist, as the autonomy of neither cities nor bureaucracies is protected by the
type of formal guarantees accorded to states or to the three branches of
26. Id. at 2317, 2325.
27. Consider, for instance, Bruce Ackerman's efforts to synthesize separation-of-powers
scholarship with the insights of administrative law, see Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation
of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2ooo), or the efforts of David Barron, Richard Briffault,
and Rick Hills to draw together the insights of local government law and federalism
scholarship, see David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DuKE L.J. 377
(2001); Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1 (2006);
Hills, supra note 13.
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government. The question raised by both essays, then, is how sticky the
informal protections are and how easily de facto sovereignty can be overridden.
If a higher-level decision-maker can easily trump any decision made by the
institutional actor in question, will it be better to pursue the kind of integrative
solution that Schragger proposes in his essay? Or does the push for de facto
autonomy provide a needed corrective by allowing lower-level actors to
buttress their power as servants?2" These kinds of questions have been
thoroughly canvassed in a number of scholarly fields, of course, but it would be
interesting if one could say something useful about these questions across
fields.
Second, the vocabulary this Commentary provides helps us untangle the
many meanings embedded in the word "power." Consider, for instance,
Barron and Schragger's disagreement about the gay marriage controversy in
California. Barron argues that those who think of San Francisco's issuance of
same-sex marriage licenses as a triumph of local power have missed the fact
that San Francisco's invocation of higher law ultimately deprived the city of the
power to make policy at the local level.29 Schragger, in contrast, celebrates
Mayor Newsom because he "not only laid claim to a role in interpreting the
California and Federal Constitutions (thus challenging the authority of the
judiciary), but he also asserted a populist vision of the mayoralty that did not
accept its relatively weak constitutional status."3
How, one might ask, can Schragger sensibly view Newsom as asserting
urban power if Barron is right that San Francisco's claim depended wholly on
its insistence that it was bound by federal law? If urban power stems solely
from policymaking autonomy - from the power of the sovereign - Barron has it
right. But if one thinks there is power associated with the role of the servant, as
Schragger obviously does, these claims can be reconciled. Indeed, even if one
agrees with Barron's reading that San Francisco was, in fact, relying on its
28. For instance, Bill Marshall describes how protecting an attorney general's autonomy even
within a limited realm may also affect those areas in which she remains a servant. See, e.g.,
Marshall, supra note 3, at 2468 (suggesting that the existence of an independent attorney
general could help "promote[] fuller decision-making before governmental action by
assuring consideration of a wider range of concerns than if the Governor acted alone"); id. at
2474 ("[A] President who must work through an independent attorney general, for example,
to initiate an extensive program of warrantless electronic surveillance or detention of
American citizens may be stilled in his efforts."). For an analysis of how the
anticommandeering principle may serve such a role in the federalism context, see Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 856 (1998).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
30. Schragger, supra note 1, at 2574.
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status as mere "functionary of the state,"3' one could still view San Francisco's
decision as an assertion of urban power.
San Francisco was relying on the power of the servant. The city's emphasis
on its fealty to federal law, rather than autonomy from federal interference,
reminded us of the ties that bind the national and the local. By affirming its
membership in the national body politic in this way, San Francisco asserted its
standing to take part in the debate on gay marriage.
While it might seem counterintuitive to think that an emphasis on the
city's subordination to federal law could lend that assertion power, we often
see such a phenomenon within the dissent tradition. For instance, as a number
of influential theorists have observed, what gives civil disobedience power is its
dual character: a minor infraction of the law paired with a declaration of
fidelity to higher law.32 Similarly, asserting one's status as a citizen or member
of the community is a common form of political theater used by those engaged
in dissenting speech.13 We may pay more attention to a social critic if she is
"one of us," 4 as Michael Walzer explains. "Critical distance is measured in
inches," writes Walzer, because an effective critic must be "[a] little to the side,
but not outside" of the community.3s
The power of the servant, in short, gives an institutional actor a different
kind of standing than the legal variant about which Barron writes. Being part
of a community gives one standing-in the colloquial sense of the word-to
criticize the community. Conversely, an insistence on sovereignty or
separateness -precisely what Barron argues confers legal standing on cities-
may undermine a city's standing to speak on issues of state or national
importance. Sovereignty inhibits the city's ability to assert the power associated
with connectedness and interdependence, a power that may ultimately be just
as important to the community the city represents.
31. Barron, supra note 6, at 2236.
32. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289 (James
Melvin Washington ed., 1986); JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 5s, at 319 (rev. ed.
1999).
33. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 25
(1999); Robert N. Strassfeld, "Lose in Vietnam, Bring the Boys Home," 82 N.C. L. REV. 1891
(2004) (documenting the strategy Vietnam protesters used to counter their opponents'
equation of dissent and disloyalty).
34. MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 39 (1985).
35. Id. at 61.
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